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Foreword: Revisiting Gilson and Kraakman's Efficiency 
Story 
Donald C. Langevoort* 
Gilson and Kraakman's Mechanisms of Market Efficiencyl is part of the canon of 
modem corporate law scholarship, one of a handful of articles that has profoundly 
influenced the way we think about the field. It is also enigmatic, warranting a fresh look 
by those who think they know what it says from some long-ago reading or second-hand 
references by other authors. 
Obligatory citations to Mechanisms often treat it as the kind of faithful embrace of a 
strong vision of capital market efficiency so common in the early 1980's-citing 
Easterbrook and Fischel for the normative implications of market efficiency, Gilson and 
Kraakman for how markets become efficient. But the latter is something of a citation 
half-truth. True, the article is an explanation of the various ways information becomes 
impounded in market price, and optimistically concedes that this is often a rapid and 
effective process. A reader inclined toward efficiency finds enou,gh to justify his own 
faith. 
But that is not all-or really what-the article is about. The underlying insight is 
that there is a repertoire of mechanisms that operate with different levels of power as 
efficiency-drivers, depending on the relative availability and initial distribution of the 
information in question. In tum, relative availability is a function of the costs of acquiring 
and verifying it. Institutions-like underwritten public offerings-may arise to lower the 
costs of verifying issuer disclosures, contributing to efficiency in primary capital raising 
transactions. The punch line, however, is that markets will demonstrate different levels of 
efficiency in impounding different kinds of information. This transaction cost story 
means that even informational efficiency is a relative concept, filled with imperfections 
when the costs associated with discovery and verification are significant-hardly a born-
again confession of faith. 
The residual agnosticism becomes clear toward the end of the article. Gilson and 
Kraakman take aim at prevailing claims that insider trading should not be prohibited 
because it contributes to more efficient pricing for failing to recognize the difficulty the 
market has in decoding the informational content of an insider's trades. They then also 
take aim at George Benston's famous claim that the mandatory disclosure regime 
imposed by the federal securities laws in the 1930's delivered no appreciable value to 
investors. In the early 1980's, these claims held great influence over the thinking of 
efficiency-minded academics. Gilson and Kraakman issue a cautionary warning about 
• Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. 
I. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency. 70 VA. L. REV. 549 
(1984) [hereinafter Mechanisms]. 
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assuming too much about the mechanisms of efficiency, and not paying enough attention 
to the cost problem. 
Had they been a bit bolder, then, they might have stricken "mechanisms" from their 
title and substituted something like "limits" or, borrowing from Grossman and Stiglitz, 
"impossibility."2 In any event, the limits to the efficiency aspect of the article anticipates 
and inspires a line of scholarship that evolved over the next twenty years about market 
failures-particularly in the form of agency cost problems-that make strong 
deregulatory claims problematic. 
This Symposium pays tribute to Mechanisms' originality, dispassion, rigor, and 
intluence. The idea was to ask a diverse mix of scholars-with an emphasis on some of 
the best young minds that have come into this field to work recently-to take inspiration 
from Gilson and Kraakman and write whatever they wished about the contemporary state 
of mind regarding market efficiency. Some are strong critics of the efficient market 
hypothesis; others still work happily within its framework. Their subjects run from the 
stock markets themselves to matters like the law of trusts, using antitrust in securities 
market regulation, and how the takeover market differs in terms of the diffusion of 
information. Afterwards, Gilson and Kraakman respond, both commenting on the papers 
and offering their own retlections on Mechanisms, many years (and much thinking) later. 
One question that intrigued many of the Symposium's participants when the papers 
were presented is why an uncontlicted vision of efficiency gained such a hold in 
academia for such a long time. In other words, why was Mechanisms cited far more for 
the support it gives to the market's efficiency properties, than its just-as-clear warnings 
about too readily assuming informational efficiency in the presence of significant 
acquisition or verification costs? Today, market efficiency is highly contested. Many 
scholars believe that markets are efficient enough, and decidedly superior to other 
mechanisms (e.g., judicial or bureaucratic intervention) for assessing the value of 
securities or firms-others do not. The working consensus, however, is that Gilson and 
Kraakman's fundamental point about the limits of efficiency with respect to costly or 
hard-to-verify information is right, and hence efficiency is a matter of degree. But that 
more ambivalent intellectual stance is of relatively recent vintage. For most of the 1980's, 
at least, and to some extent well beyond, efficiency ruled. 
The reasons for that domination are complicated. No doubt the story begins, as 
Gilson and Kraakman note at the outset of their article, with the seemingly solid 
empirical support it had garnered during the 1970's. Financial economists marshaled an 
impressive case in favor of the efficient market hypothesis-the study of anomalies was 
in its infancy, largely uninteresting to legal academics, and behavioral finance 
scholarship was an invention yet to come. There was ample support for assuming a high 
degree of "semi-strong" market efficiency, and as many have noted, those implications 
led to a series of unconventional, challenging, and rigorously demonstrable normative 
insights-the scholar's holy grail. At just this time, in tum, two related phenomena about 
which efficiency theory had much to say-hostile corporate takeovers and insider 
trading-were quickly becoming matters of cultural and political fascination. Scholars 
embracing efficiency therefore could not only be challenging but important, with 
2. See Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient 
Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1980). 
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currency outside their otherwise obscure discipline. But bold, confident claims were 
necessary to establish the scholarly voice here: doubt or ambiguity was disfavored. 
No doubt there is a political dimension to all this. We tend to think today of the pro-
efficiency move as innately conservative. In the late 1970's and very early 1980's, 
however, proponents of increased market competition, invoking the mantle of economic 
efficiency, were often politically progressive, attacking governmentally-supported 
monopolies and oligopolies as rent-extracting "big business." In securities regulation, the 
challenges of that decade to the hegemony of the New York Stock Exchange, and the 
emergence of the idealized national market system were examples of conventional 
economic theory enlisted in the name of pro-investor reform. The rhetoric of efficiency in 
the name of open competition had a small hint of populism to it. The generation of legal 
scholars who learned conventional economic analysis at that time did so without 
necessarily carrying any right-wing baggage. 
The 1980's gradually moved the idealization of "free markets" to the right, in an 
ever more aggressive search for forms of regulation that could be challenged as 
unnecessary interference with competition in order to shrink the governmental domain. 
More and more of corporate and securities law was questioned as bureaucratically 
misguided paternalism or, invoking public choice theory, rent-seeking protectionism by 
entrenched interests. Some of this, of course, was on the mark. But the enthusiastic 
reception was also the product of support from those who found these intellectual ideas 
good cover for a political agenda. Those favoring a largely unfettered hostile takeover 
market, or the elimination of mandatory disclosure requirements, were happy to promote 
the scholarship and enlist the scholars on their behalf. While this political transformation 
was happening, however, its background was one in which market-oriented economic 
analysis still attracted a broad range of scholars and policy-makers. When Gilson and 
Kraakman published Mechanisms in 1984, the market for scholarship was primed for 
pro-efficiency work, and it was read largely in that light. 
The brief embrace of strong market efficiency by the SEC illustrates the demand 
side story of which Mechanism takes note in its opening paragraph.3 In a handful of rule 
adoptions by the Commission in the early 1980's, the efficient market hypothesis was 
highlighted as justification for deregulation. As I have tried to show elsewhere, the 
Commission's embrace was more fac;ade than substance: the deregulatory steps could 
easily be justified on cost-benefit grounds even without any strong assumptions about 
efficiency.4 But the very fact that even the SEC was, for a short time, willing to pledge its 
allegiance to the rhetoric of market efficiency testifies to its allure during that period. 
Eventually, the idealization of the markets faded and, as noted above, the scholarly 
consensus began to accept a more ambivalent view of marketplace efficiency and its 
limits. Here, again, the story is more complicated than it seems. Abuses in the takeover 
market and the string of insider trading scandals in the mid and late 1980's made strong 
deregulatory positions less appealing than they had been. Economists were challenging 
the empirical underpinnings of the efficient market hypothesis, and alternative theories of 
market price behavior were emerging rapidly. In the early 1990's, the political climate 
3. Mechanisms, supra note I, at 550, n.3-4. 
4. Donald C. Langevoort, Theories. Assumptions and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 
140 U. PA. L. REV. 851 (1991) (analyzing the "gulf' that has developed between current economics literature 
and the conception of market efficiency in the legal culture). 
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shifted, albeit briefly, altering the balance of intellectual influence in policy-making. Had 
Mechanisms been published even five years later than it was, its substantive contribution 
would have been much the same and just as valuable, but I suspect it would have been 
interpreted differently by many of its readers. Now, of course, we have had scandals like 
Enron and W orldcom that have further weakened the faith.5 
A re-reading of Mechanisms shows how well it actually anticipated many of the 
scholarly moves that followed in the next two decades. There are two footnotes, for 
example, taking note of early work doubting whether market efficiency is as well-
grounded empirically as its proponents were claiming.6 Gilson and Kraakman observe 
that departures from efficiency are "precisely what we would expect where publicly-
announced information is genuinely new and difficult to value, and where large numbers 
of traders consequently elect not to invest in valuation costs."7 
The authors are also careful to focus their attention on the informational efficiency 
of the markets in contrast to fundamental efficiency-markets can have a rapid speed of 
adjustment without necessarily producing a rational equilibrium. To be sure, Mechanisms 
at many places assumes that noise trading is largely unsystematic and, therefore, nets out 
in an unbiased fashion. But it does not deny that noise trading could lead to sustained 
departures from fundamental value. Indeed, that very idea was pursued four years later by 
Reinier Kraakman in a thoughtful paper on hostile takeovers, not cited as frequently as it 
should be, showing that evidence of noisy stock prices makes it hard to devise an optimal 
regulatory policy. If stock prices can be "irrationally" depressed over a sustained period, 
takeovers directed at such firms are a form of cherry-picking without efficiency benefits.8 
In making this claim, he was not repudiating anything in Mechanisms. And it is hardly a 
large step to go from Mechanisms' discussion of derivatively informed trading to models 
of momentum trading that are commonplace in the contemporary finance literature.9 
Paying tribute to Mechanisms is not to say that it got everything right. Its scholarly 
virtue is subtlety and restraint; it is careful not to over-claim at a time when other scholars 
seemed sure and confident in their roles as intellectual norms entrepreneurs. It recognized 
the difficulties and challenges of regulation, and the need for much more work. Gilson 
and Kraakman provoked hard thinking about market mechanisms among a generation of 
scholars, and helped set in motion a progressive research program still on-going today. 
For this, as well as its many enduring insights, it deserves its place in the canon. 
5. E.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Meansfor the Management and Control of the Modern Business 
Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233 (2002). 
6. Mechanisms, supra note I, at 551 n.IO, 626 n.205. 
7. Id. at 626 n.205. 
8. Reinier Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of "Discounted" Share Prices as an 
AcqUisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 891 (1988). 
9. E.g., Harrison Hong & Jeremy Stein, A Unified Theory of Underreaction Momentum Trading and 
Overreaction in Asset Markets, 54 J. FIN. 2143 (1999). 
